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Message from the Editors 
 
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular 
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is 
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into the 
Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and second, to 
bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share their 
knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and non-violent 
irregular challenges. This case study is part of an ongoing effort at 
CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by world-renowned academics, 
case studies, research papers, articles, and books. 
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi is the author of this case study, which 
focuses on the Taliban. This case study was created to focus on two 
specific challenges that our experienced operators and practitioners face in 
Afghanistan: how to understand the actors and the complex irregular 
warfare environment; and how to manage interaction, adaptation, and 
reassessment in irregular warfare. 
In this case study, Giustozzi relies on his extensive experience in 
Afghanistan as a researcher to create an insightful analysis of the Taliban. 
The author discusses a wide range of topics including assessments of the 
Taliban’s strengths and weaknesses, their ability to reassess and adapt as 
well as their operational and strategic successes and failures. We believe 
he has presented a balanced treatment of the subject matter. Balance, 
however, does not mean that the case study will be uncontroversial. In 
fact, Giustozzi’s analysis contains some rather blunt appraisals of many of 
the major actors in this conflict; including both ISAF and the Taliban.  
This version of the case study was submitted in October 2011. We 
are at work on addendums that focus on individuals or specific factions 
within the Taliban network including the Haqqani network. The point is to 
make these case studies part of an evolving and adaptive curriculum that 
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fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet the challenges of the post 
9/11 world.  
Keep in mind that the questions and issues that this work raises go 
far beyond the Taliban and the borders of Afghanistan. By focusing on 
one type of armed group—the Taliban—and understanding its weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities, we are able to extrapolate what factors contribute to 
the success or failure of armed groups in general. We can examine the 
inter-relationship between the goals, strategies, and operational and 
tactical capabilities of other armed groups. For example, these groups can 
suffer from strategic overextension and they can reach past their 
culminating point of attack and even culminating point of victory. The 
question is, how do we recognize these opportunities and what can we do 
to take advantage of them?  
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case study. 
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author 
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval 
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to 
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible 
for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in 
all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide 
variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as 
well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the 
battlefield.  The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and 
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet 
the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that 
real people faced in high-pressure situations. 
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ANA – Afghan National Army 
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ANCOP – Afghan National Civil Order Police 
ANSO – Afghan NGO Security Office 
COIN – Counter Insurgency 
DIAG – Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups 
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
IED – Improvised Explosive Device 
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force 
KGB – The Committee for State Security, the Soviet National Security Agency 
from 1954-1991 
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OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom 
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Figure 2: Political Map of Afghanistan (2008) 
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Figure 3: Ethnic Map of Afghanistan  
 
Note: The religious division between Sunni and Shiite Muslims almost 
entirely coincides with that between the Hazara majority areas (Shiite) and 
the other ethnic groups. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This case study analyses how the different sides in the conflict in 
Afghanistan—primarily the Taliban and the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF)—have developed their strategies over time. The 
emphasis is very much on the adaptation and counteradaptation process, in 
which opposing sides evaluate each other, study each other, take each 
other’s blows, and react by shaping up, changing, adapting. The more 
flexible an adversary is, the more difficult to defeat; flexibility can make 
up for an inferiority in resources and numbers. The capacity to adapt is an 
indicator of flexibility, and that is why the case study will focus on this 
aspect. 
Much adaptation for the challenges of war has taken place on both 
sides (less so within the Afghan armed forces). The insurgents have 
invested great efforts in developing, adapting, or redeveloping asymmetric 
tactics (IEDs, suicide attacks, targeted assassinations on a large scale, 
etc.), while ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have greatly 
improved information gathering and their targeting of insurgent 
commanders and leaders. Both sides have been looking at ways to 
decentralize their fighting forces in order to operate more rapidly and 
safely. Adaptation, however, always has trade-offs. For instance, targeted 
assassination weakens the legitimacy of a fighting force, as does 
indiscriminate violence. Similarly, decentralization makes command and 
control more difficult.  
Change and adaptation are not the same. Adaptation implies a 
degree of success, whereas change is neutral—it can be successful or 
unsuccessful. Even adaptation, however, is not necessarily enough if it 
does not occur in a coherent fashion. ISAF/OEF’s counterinsurgency 
effort has been erratic and inconsistent, with frequent changes of focus: 
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some movement in one direction, then in the opposite, some adaptation of 
the military effort coupled with little or no changes in the political effort. 
Until 2010, the counterinsurgency effort had failed to contain the 
insurgency, let alone defeat it. Much of the change that occurred before 
2010 was appropriate, hence qualifying as adaptation, but its erratic 
character prevented it from achieving the desired impact on the 
insurgency. Developments from 2010 onwards are more difficult to 
evaluate, but at least the ability to inflict damage on the insurgents 
improved significantly; the political dimension of counterinsurgency still 
appears to be very weak.  
 
The key lessons from this analysis are as follows: 
 By 2001, Afghanistan had a long history of virtually 
uninterrupted conflict, with a large number of people having experience of 
war as protagonists and accumulating the know-how of fighting an 
insurgency. 
 However, insurgencies are dynamic processes of adaptation 
and counteradaptation. Insurgents, as much as counterinsurgents, have to 
keep learning and being flexible and adaptable.  
 Although the Taliban took inspiration from the 1980s and 
1990s, they had to innovate as the counterinsurgency pressure on them 
increased. The actual tactics employed in the post-2001 guerrilla war were 
in fact very different from those employed earlier, mainly because the 
adversary had changed and was technologically much more resourceful.  
 No tactic or strategy is good or bad in itself; it just might or 
might not fit a particular environment. The Taliban are neither particularly 
efficient nor capable nor sophisticated as an insurgent movement, but they 
have been able to match their limited human resources in management and 
educational terms with appropriate strategy and tactics. 
 The Taliban’s modus operandi fits well with the 
fragmentation of Afghan society. Rather than trying to regiment their rank 
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and file according to rigid rules, they allow entrepreneurs of violence 
much space within a limited set of basic rules they have agreed to, and in 
fact rely on them for most tasks, including much of logistics.  
 There is a trade-off between the Taliban’s resilience and 
efficiency, particularly insofar as their resilience is obtained through 
decentralization. 
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II. The Taliban in Afghanistan: An Overview 
A. Operation Omid 
In 2009 to early 2010, the Taliban were at the apex of their power 
in Zhari, a primarily Pashtun district in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. 
They controlled almost all of the rural areas, rarely challenged by the 
government or the Canadian Forces. Taliban members openly roamed 
around, maintaining a few hundred full-time fighters and administering 
justice in several courts; their governor interacted with the population. 
They grew over-confident, exposing themselves, showing their judges’ 
and administrators’ faces and identities. 
When ISAF and the Afghan security forces moved in in force in 
2010’s Operation Omid, Taliban losses were numerous, although they 
pulled back most of their full-time fighters rather than confront the 
advancing ISAF/Afghan forces. Elements hostile to the Taliban felt 
encouraged to emerge and show their support for the government, even 
forming a militia (Afghan Local Police) in a few villages. The Taliban 
were no longer able to maintain permanent bases in the district. 
However, this was not the end of the Taliban in Zhari. They 
reorganized and adapted. As of July 2011, the number of full-time fighters 
had not returned to its previous high but had recovered from the low 
reached in Operation Omid’s aftermath. Re-infiltration occurred steadily 
after spring 2011, but the Taliban now operated more discreetly, relying 
on an underground structure in many villages, avoiding establishing 
permanent bases, and rotating their full-time staff in and out of the district 
more often than before. Their administrative and judicial structures were 
now mobile and often staffed by people from outside the district, which 
made it more difficult for the villagers to identify and relate to local 
governance structures.  
The Taliban succeeded in improving their organization to the point 
where they could rotate military commanders between units, effectively 
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merging what might have been several separate insurgencies into one and 
strengthening command and control by the leadership. The Taliban’s 
ability to use Zhari to infiltrate Kandahar might have been reduced, but at 
the same time, as in several other districts of Helmand and Kandahar, they 
were holding down a much larger ISAF and Afghan government force 
while still controlling most of the population and making gains elsewhere 
in the country. Perceptions count, and in the perception of the local 
population, the Taliban were as much in control in July 2011 as they had 
been before Operation Omid. Although it had been earlier assessed as a 
success, in the longer-term perspective, the operation might only have 
compelled the Taliban to evolve a few steps higher.  
This vignette, one of a hundred such examples that could be drawn 
from the current conflict in Afghanistan, raises two important questions 
about the consequences of interaction and adaptation: What are the roots 
of the Taliban’s way of warfare? How are they able to adapt and overcome 
the fog and friction of conflict? The answer to both of these questions lies 
in the history of conflict in Afghanistan and the social, economic, and 
military consequences of protracted warfare on Afghan society.  
 
B. A Brief Background 
The Afghan communist government came to power with a military 
coup in April 1978, prompting a jihad that continued in 1980 against the 
Soviet army. (See Appendix A: Historical Context.) Every military 
organization that has participated in the post-2001 conflict has its roots in 
this jihad. This explains why non-state armed groups in today’s 
Afghanistan are all Islamist, fundamentalist, or at least Islamic 
conservative.1 The consequences of this conflict and the Afghanistan civil 
                                                          
1 While initially there was some leftist, chiefly Maoist, and nationalist participation in the 
resistance movement, it waned because of the popular understanding of the conflict as a 
jihad, which by its nature favored Islamic groups. and because of external support from 
the United States, Pakistan, and Arab countries primarily focused on Islamists and 
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war in the 1990s include the creation of a professional military class with 
deep roots in society; the destabilization of social, political, and economic 
life; and the accumulation of tactical and operational military knowledge. 
 The Taliban existed during the 1980s in the form of Taliban 
guerrilla fronts, mostly associated with the clerical party of the 
mujahideen, Harakat-i Enqelab-i Islami (Movement of the Islamic 
Revolution). 2 The party as a whole demobilized in 1992 and barely took 
part in the civil war.3 The Taliban emerged as an autonomous movement 
in 1994 but did not adopt guerrilla tactics. They fought instead as a semi-
regular force, massing for conventional battles. Arguably, their military 
organization was more in line with the available resources (human and 
financial) than those of their rivals. Once they took Kabul in 1996, the 
Taliban developed something more like a standing army, with some 
artillery and armor and a small air force, and even incorporated some 
                                                                                                                                                
fundamentalist groups. See G. Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending (London: Hurst, 2005); 
Lawrence Malkin, “Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal 17, no.3 (2000); Geraint 
Hughes, “The Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989: An Overview,” Defense Studies Nov 
(2008): 326-50. 
2 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending; this author’s personal interviews with former 
mujahideen commanders, 2007-9; Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, The 
Enemies We Create (London: Hurst, forthcoming 2011). 
3 For many readers, this overview of interaction and adaption in the period before current 
US involvement provides sufficient background to understand the current context. There 
is a detailed bibliography at the end of this case study on these issues, however, for those 
who are interested in further research, it is worth mentioning some of the academic 
resources on the topic. The best overall study of the period as far as political and social 
dynamics are concerned is Dorronsoro’s Revolution Unending; in particular it features 
the only scholarly analysis of the Taliban regime, as well as of the Taliban in 1994-6. As 
an introduction to the world of Afghan militants, David Edwards’ Before Taliban is 
excellent. Military tactics, organization and dynamics are discussed in Anthony Davis’ 
chapter (Taliban), Giustozzi’s Empires of Mud (the militias) and Olivier Roy’s articles 
(‘War as a Factor of Entry into Politics’ and “Nature de la guerre en Afghanistan’). 
Giustozzi and Roy in particular discuss the social dynamics underpinning changes in 
military organization. Tactics in particular are discussed in Jalali/Grau, The Other Side of 
the Mountain. 
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officers of the former pro-Soviet army. The infantry, however, largely 
continued to use the same tactics as in 1994-95.4 
The guerrilla phase of the jihad (1981-91) is of the greatest interest 
to us in order to understand post-2001 developments. Many of the tactics 
developed in the 1980s were used from 2002 onwards, as were some 
organizational techniques such as fighting on assigned fronts, a degree of 
centralized control, communications, and the development of a 
bureaucracy in Pakistan to oversee it all. Propaganda techniques and 
themes were also based on those of the 1980s. The way the insurgents of 
the 1970s and 1980s spread their influence presents some similarity with 
post-2001 Taliban techniques: political agents testing the ground; small 
teams moving in and securing the environment before more assets were 
moved in and local recruitment started in earnest.  
Although much of the attention today, and this case study, is 
focused on the Taliban, in reality a variety of military-political actors have 
some degree of influence on the Afghan scene. (See Appendix D: Other 
Insurgent and Pro-Government Groups.) Pro-government non-state actors 
have a major impact in all regions, particularly in the north. Within the 
insurgency, smaller players like Hizb-i Islami play a significant role in 
some regions, chiefly the east. The interaction among these groups differs 
from region to region and is often complex, with alliances made and 
unmade. 
This complex interrelationship among different actors in the 
insurgency characterizes the current conflict in Afghanistan and can be 
illustrated by looking at the province of Baghlan in 2010.5 Both the 
Taliban and Hizb-i Islami were active here by early 2010, sharing control 
over Pashtun villages in the northern and northwestern parts of the 
                                                          
4 See Davis’s chapter in David B. Edward, Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan 
jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).  
5 See also the following documentary: Dispatches: Afghanistan: Behind Enemy Lines 
[Video]. (2010). Retrieved September 27, 2011, from, 
http://www.channel4.com/programmes/dispatches/4od#3111511. 
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province. The Taliban also had a presence among Tajiks, having co-opted 
some former commanders of Jamiat-i Islami, their ancient rivals. Hizb-i 
Islami and the Taliban even shared use of the Taliban’s judiciary.6  
However, tension existed between the two groups. The typical 
member of the Taliban was of humbler social origins than Hizb-i Islami’s, 
and the two groups competed for resources, in particular the apportioning 
of tax collection. (See Appendix B: Afghanistan’s Economic 
Environment.) The Taliban and Hizb-i Islami clashed repeatedly and 
violently over tax collection apportionment in 2010, and Hizb-i Islami was 
almost entirely eradicated as a result.  
Tension also existed within the Taliban itself, between Pashtuns 
and Tajiks. The Tajik commanders had been the first to side with the 
Taliban in 2008 and received all the key positions at the provincial level, 
such as shadow governor and military commander. They also were in 
charge of the distribution of supplies and cash. During 2010, the Taliban 
succeeded in mobilizing many Pashtuns in the province, and leadership 
was transferred to a Pashtun governor and a Pashtun military commander. 
In comparison, only a few small groups of Taliban operated among Tajiks, 
mostly in remote areas. The Tajiks protested their lost influence by the 
spring of 2010, suspending military operations and asking either to be 
given a key position at the top or an entirely separate supply structure to 
manage themselves. A number of Tajik commanders reconciled with the 
Afghan government later that year.7 
 
 
                                                          
6 This is referred to in the video as the “judiciary of the Islamic Emirate.’ 
7 A. Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North (Kabul/Berlin: 
Afghan  
Analyst Network, 2011); A. Giustozzi and C. Reuter, The Northern Front: the Afghan 
insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns (Berlin: Afghanistan Analysts Network , 
2010). 
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Discussion Questions 
1. Could NATO forces have readapted and assessed their 
tactics to leverage the Taliban vs. Hizb-i Islami and Pashtun vs. Tajik 
infighting? 
2. What are the opportunities and pitfalls in aligning with one 
tribe, clan, or political group over another? Is it a viable strategy for long-
term success? 
3. Is it realistic to engage a community without brokering 
with influential political, economic, and religious groups? 
  
 
C. Structure and Organization 
The Taliban is by far the largest opposition armed group in 
Afghanistan, accounting for more than 80 percent of the total number of 
insurgents. Their ideology can be described as Islamic fundamentalist, but 
there are variations within the movement, with its eastern Afghan wing 
(Peshawar shura) being more influenced by political Islamism. Although 
the leadership of Mullah Omar over the Taliban is largely undisputed, the 
extent to which the Taliban leadership is able to control its rank and file is 
a matter of debate. It relies on a mix of incentives, rewards, and direct 
orders to ensure a degree of compliance. Appointments to positions of 
leadership are decided at the local level by consensus through 
commissions appointed by the central leadership. Only when consensus 
cannot be reached does the central leadership step in to make a decision.8  
The Taliban have always been a collection of small religious 
networks—a network of networks. The leadership has tried over the years 
to create an organized structure to overlay these networks, presumably to 
                                                          
8 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Rise of the Neo-Taliban 
Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); A. Giustozzi, 
Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects (New York: The Century Foundation, 
June 2010). 
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reduce the impact of personal conflict among network leaders. In a sense, 
this could be described as an effort at institution building. Some success 
was achieved in this regard, but the Taliban essentially were still a 
network of networks in early 2011. The nature of these networks in the 
south is predominantly religious, and the typical commander is a mullah or 
a religious student (talib), although he might recruit on a tribal or sub-
tribal basis. In the east (Peshawar shura), former mujahideen and other 
non-clerical elements have a larger presence, even in leadership positions, 
but the structure is still network oriented.9  
The predominant or “mainstream Taliban” view is represented by 
the leadership’s official position; at present, it argues for the expulsion of 
Westerners from Afghanistan and also insists that the fighters respect rules 
of engagement and of conduct determined by the leadership itself. Another 
viewpoint is more radical. It is hostile to leadership’s effort to impose 
rules of engagement, more inclined to utilize indiscriminate terror tactics, 
and more inclined to cooperate with foreign jihadist elements. Once led by 
Mullah Dadullah, who was killed in 2007, it has been in disarray since his 
death but was considered to be in the ascendency in 2010-11, despite the 
absence of a clear leader. A third, small, faction displays pro-Iranian 
inclinations. There is also a more moderate tendency, not yet organized as 
a faction, favorable to negotiations, whose size is difficult to gauge but 
seems significant; some leaders at the national and local level allegedly 
belong to this tendency, including Mullah Baradar.10 
 
 
                                                          
9 Giustozzi, “Negotiating…”; T. Ruttig, How Tribal Are the Taliban? (Kabul/Berlin: 
Afghanistan Analysts Network , 2010). 
10 Personal communications with UN officials, 2010; Linschoten and Kuehn, The 
Enemies We Create; on Baradar see Carl Forsberg, The Taliban’s Campaign for 
Kandahar (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2009): 32. 
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Internal Coherence and Ability of Political Leadership to Exercise 
Control 
The Taliban leadership has been steadily trying to increase the 
degree of control it exercises over its rank and file. Its control has always 
been stronger in the areas close to the Pakistani border, not least because 
of the use of a courier system as well as the practice of summoning 
commanders and local leaders to Pakistan for briefings. In areas where 
military pressure is greatest, the leadership’s effort to exercise command 
and control has been disrupted and the Taliban have readapted using an 
almost completely decentralized system. In contrast, in areas where 
military pressure has not been as high, they have maintained a tighter 
control: examples are Zabul and Ghazni. Even in these areas, the senior 
leadership is not able to completely or immediately impose its views and 
has to rely on a degree of cooperation and sympathy from its local 
leaders.11  
In areas away from the Pakistani border, such as the provinces on 
the Central Asian border, command and control from Pakistan is 
particularly difficult. When combined with intense military pressure, the 
local Taliban have often been thrown into disarray, as in Badghis in 2010 
or Kunduz in 2010-11. The comparison between the southern and the 
northern borders highlights the role of the Taliban system of command 
and control in making the insurgency more resilient. The leadership 
intervenes to replace losses and solve disputes, enabling the combatants to 
focus on fighting; supplies and assistance can be made available, as well 
as punishment and reward. The Taliban are known to have sometimes 
punished and even executed their commanders for misconduct.12 
 
                                                          
11 Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban; interviews with Taliban members and 
sympathizers, Ghazni, 2010. 
12 A. Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter, The Insurgents of the Afghan North; Joshua 
Partlow, “U.S. strikes at the heart of Taliban leadership,” Washington Post, October 24, 
2010. 
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Recruitment 
Taliban mobilization first focused on recalling members of the 
movement dispersed after defeat in late 2001. Their success in this regard 
was mixed, with only a relatively small minority of former members 
willing to get involved in a guerrilla war, with all the implications that this 
has in terms of lifestyle, risk, and personal sacrifices. Their strongest 
constituency after 2001 turned out to be the clergy, particularly the new 
generation of Pakistani-trained mullahs. The clergy was upset by its 
marginalization in post-2001 Afghanistan and by cultural changes that the 
mullahs found unacceptable.13 The madrasas in Pakistan also provided a 
steady flow of young recruits.  
Taliban recruitment has been growing steadily since 2002, and 
evidence suggests that recruitment was still going well in 2010, despite 
increased pressure and some territorial losses. The overall level of 
insurgent-initiated attacks increased by 54 percent in 2010, according to 
ISAF, and by 64 percent, according to ANSO. This would have been 
difficult to attain without some expansion of the ranks.14 What drives this 
recruitment is a matter of debate. ISAF and the Afghan government tend 
to present economic interpretations, claiming that most Taliban recruits 
are motivated by the offer of payment by the organization. However, 
evidence suggests that the main drivers of Taliban recruitment are 
religious and ideological, at least as far as the full-time fighters and 
political cadres are concerned.  
Grievances abound in Afghanistan because of the fragmented 
nature of society, which makes the distribution of aid, services and favors 
unequal; in segmented societies there is always a potential for conflict, and 
the Taliban have set out to exploit this.15 (See Appendix C: Afghanistan—
A Fragmented Society.) Their wider recruitment efforts were aimed at 
                                                          
13 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop; Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban. 
14 On ANSO, see www.afgnso.org.  
15 Giustozzi, Afghanistan’s 30 Years War 
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enlisting the support of local communities, exploiting local conflicts and 
gaps in governance. Taliban political agents and preachers were 
dispatched around the country to assess the potential of different 
communities and exploit opportunities. Typically, communities subjected 
to discrimination by government officials or that felt short-changed in the 
post-2001 distribution of the spoils were most inclined to lend support to 
the Taliban. The elders leading many communities initially might have 
allowed the Taliban into their villages as a way to signal to the central 
government their displeasure, but frequently later lost control over their 
guests. 16 
The Taliban also targeted perceived “loose cannons” within both 
the rural and the urban populations for recruitment. In such cases, a 
complex propaganda effort was mounted, including a variety of press 
outlets and websites. Radio broadcasts have been more erratic because of 
the difficulty of broadcasting deep into Afghanistan. Taliban propaganda 
appears designed to exploit friction between the population and foreign 
forces, which inevitably occurs and which has been intensifying over time 
as the number of troops has increased. To at least some extent, the Taliban 
have succeeded in becoming a vehicle for the expression of grievance; 
since 2006, they have appeared as a serious opposition force with a strong 
chance of forcing at least a new political settlement, if not outright victory. 
Having reached this critical mass, even groups and individuals who do not 
appreciate the Taliban from a religious or ideological point of view started 
having relations with them.  
Apart from their core fighters, probably numbering around 60,000 
at the beginning of 2010 (roughly half being deployed in Afghanistan at 
any given time), the Taliban boasts hundreds of political cadres and tens 
of thousands of facilitators and supporters. The Taliban have also been 
mobilizing communities to fight alongside them, motivated by the desire 
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to defend the community against perceived external threats.17 Community 
lashkars were mobilized in parts of Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan, 
particularly from 2006 onwards. Community mobilization occurred in a 
few spots outside the south as well, but it has been rare—the best-known 
example is Koringal valley in Kunar. Such lashkars have been fighting on 
and off with the Taliban, but by 2010 they had mostly demobilized due to 
heavy casualties.  
The casualty rate is high, with Taliban sources acknowledging 500 
killed in 2010 in Helmand alone, which has driven opportunists and 
mercenaries away from the movement. Behavior in battle suggests a stern 
commitment to the fight. Few Taliban are captured on the battlefield; most 
prisoners are rounded up in their homes or seized in night raids. Finally, 
from what can be gathered from ISAF concerning prisoner interrogation, it 
is rare for Taliban members to claim to have been induced to fight by the 
offer of economic rewards. They usually claim to be loyal to the Taliban 
and seem to be closely identified with the movement. Certainly, recruits 
have various motivations for joining the Taliban, varying from revenge to 
indoctrination in madrasas to a lust for adventure, but it would seem that 
the Taliban are doing a fairly good job at socializing members into the 
movement.18 
Ethnically, it is estimated that the Taliban is 93 percent Pashtun 
and the remaining 7 percent a mix of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashais, and others 
(see map for the ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan). Although modest, this 
percentage of non-Pashtuns (who account for about 50 percent of the total 
                                                          
17 Accounts of the fighting in Helmand seem to clearly indicate the presence of such 
community mobilization; the same can be said of Korengal. For the latter see Sebastian 
Junger, War (London: Fourth Estate, 2010). 
18 ANSO Quarterly Report 4 (2010), www.converge.org.nz/pma/nccdaf6.pdf; Gareth 
Porter, “Deferring to Petraeus: National Intelligence Estimate Failed to Register Taliban 
Growth,” CounterPunch, February 14, 2011; Carlotta Gall, “Midlevel Taliban Admit to a 
Rift With Top Leaders,” The New York Times, February 21, 2011; personal 
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population of Afghanistan) has been rising in recent years. Among new 
recruits, the percentage of non-Pashtuns has steadily risen at the expense 
of Pashtuns, even if in absolute numbers more and more Pashtun recruits 
have been forthcoming. Ethnic tensions within the Taliban have been 
reported—Tajik commanders often seem to be among the moderates (but 
not always), while Uzbeks tend to be among the radicals, for example19—
but these ethnic divisions do not necessarily coincide with different 
political tendencies. 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Taliban recruitment increased from 2002–2010. What are 
the primary drivers for recruitment? How ha the Afghan central 
government and ISAF failed to reduce recruitment? 
2. Considering that the clergy play a fundamental role in 
mobilizing the insurgents, what strategy, if any, could be implemented to 
respond to that threat? What role does nostalgia play in the typical Afghan 
view of the Taliban or mujahedeen? 
3. What strategic gaps exist that allow the Taliban to continue 
exploiting foreign aid? Specifically, the implication that aid fuels conflict 
in unequal, segmented tribal enclaves throughout Afghanistan? 
  
 
D. The Strategic Balance 
The strategic balance has been constantly shifting since 2001. 
From a position of complete marginality in 2002, the insurgents managed 
to reach a strategic stalemate, if not a slight advantage, by 2009. The 
Afghan government in Kabul looked much more disunited than the 
                                                          
19 Giustozzi, The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns - The Afghanistan Papers No. 5 
(Waterloo, Ontario: CIGI,  
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insurgents themselves as the insurgents continued to make territorial gains 
and expand their influence, including among ethnic minorities (i.e., non-
Pashtuns). (See Appendix E: The Afghan Government.) The number of 
insurgents steadily grew. The reaction of the American government to a 
perceived risk of failure in Afghanistan brought the dispatch of more 
troops and the allocation of more resources to the Afghan theater. The 
result was the consolidation of the stalemate, but also the introduction of 
new elements of fluidity, which made predicting an outcome particularly 
difficult.  
By early 2011, it became evident that the Taliban were losing 
ground for the first time in a number of areas, particularly Kunduz and 
some parts of Helmand and Kandahar. They were still gaining ground in 
other parts of the country, particularly in Nangarhar, and recovering 
strength in western Afghanistan, where they had suffered badly in 2009. 
The Taliban structure of command and control, which they had tried so 
hard to develop, was suffering as a result of the massive increase in 
Special Forces raids targeting commanders and leaders. At the same time, 
the legitimacy of the Afghan government did not seem to be increasing, 
nor was the popularity of foreign intervention.20 
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III. The Taliban: Strategy and Operations 
Until recently, a majority of observers doubted that the Taliban had 
a strategy at all, arguing that they simply operated as a franchise of radical 
groups that were intent on creating as much disruption as possible. Over 
time, however, it has become increasingly clear that the Taliban does have 
a strategy. A strategy might even have been in place in the early phases of 
the insurgency (2002-05): the Pakistani Taliban were carrying out raids 
alongside the border, attracting the attention of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and drawing it away from the Taliban’s slow in-depth infiltration 
of communities, leaving the inefficient and unpopular police as the only 
force to try to contain them. Other signs of an overall strategy emerged 
later, as the Taliban moved cadres from the provinces affected by the 
fighting and sent them to areas of fresh expansion to train and encourage 
inexperienced fighters. Geographic expansion has clearly been a priority 
for the Taliban and they have reaped benefits from their investments, 
bringing the conflict to new provinces every year.21  
How the Taliban’s strategy has been developed is not clear. It is 
known that debates have taken place within the leadership on specific 
issues, and we also know that the leadership is constantly assisted by 
Pakistani advisors, who very likely contribute to strategy development. 
The allocation of human and material resources is also debated by the 
leaders. For example, a debate occurred in 2007 concerning the 
opportunity to send cadres into Farah province to exploit extremely weak 
local governance and tribal connections between the Noorzais of 
Kandahar, recently recruited to the Taliban cause, and the Noorzais of 
Farah.22 Some Taliban leaders, notably the Haqqanis, argued that Farah 
was not suitable to guerrilla war and that cadres there would be exposed. 
                                                          
21 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop; Gilles Dorronsoro, The Taliban’s Winning 
Strategy (Washington: The Carnegie Endowment, 2009). 
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Those in favor of investing in Farah prevailed, however, and eastern and 
central Farah turned into a hotbed of Taliban activity in 2007-08. In 2009, 
an ISAF reaction led to the extermination of the local Taliban leadership 
and heavy losses of cadres, vindicating the Haqqanis’ views. In general, 
issues are debated by the leaders, with input by advisers, which in some 
cases can be decisive if Pakistani interests are at stake. Decisions are taken 
by consensus, or by majority if consensus is not achievable.23 
There are clear indications that the strategy of the Taliban evolves 
and adapts to the circumstances. The Taliban faced a backlash following 
their rapid expansion in 2006-07, for example, as many communities that 
they were entering strongly objected to their very conservative mores and 
to the enforcement of Mullah Omar’s social edicts. These dated back to 
when the Taliban regime was in power in the 1990s and included a ban on 
music and on kite flying. After some discussion, Mullah Omar issued a 
decree authorizing the field commanders to not implement his social 
edicts, including the ban on music and orders to pray five times a day, if 
they judged that the environment was not conducive to them. This is a 
clear example of adaptation and strategic flexibility. In an apparent effort 
to limit civilian casualties, the leadership later gradually started tightening 
the rules on military engagement, another example of adaptation. This was 
probably in response to debates on civilian casualties, both in the West 
and in Afghanistan. Conversely, another example of Taliban strategic 
adaptation was the decision to appoint radical commanders to keep the 
level of violence high in 2010 in order to take advantage of ISAF’s 
perceived lack of political will to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely.24 
One of the most recent debates within the Taliban leadership 
concerns the issue of negotiations with the Afghan government. The 
debate appears to have been heated, with different positions confronting 
each other. A majority vote within the leadership, presumably in early 
                                                          
23 Waldman, Sun in the Sky; interviews with Taliban members and sympathizers, 2008-9. 
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2010, saw the position sponsored by Mullah Omar prevail: negotiate only 
from a position of strength after having defeated ISAF’s “surge.” It is still 
unclear how the Taliban view negotiations—whether they are their 
ultimate goal or only a tactic to get foreign armies out of the country. 
There does seem to be genuine war-weariness building up within the 
Taliban’s ranks among those commanders who have been on the scene for 
a while and have witnessed the heavy casualty rate and those who have 
developed personal issues with some of their colleagues. The problem 
appears to be that negotiating reconciliation implies risks, both from the 
Taliban who have assassination squads targeting the defectors as well as 
from government officials who might have personal rivalries with the 
reconciling Taliban.25 
 
A. The Battle of Pashmul 
The importance of operational planning in conflict is recorded in 
the ability of operations to achieve their strategic goals. This brief vignette 
focuses on this issue of interaction and operational cause and effect from 
the Taliban’s perspective. 
The Taliban reportedly conceived the Pashmul operation in 2005, 
when it became known to them that Canadian troops would take over 
responsibility for Kandahar province. Conceived by Mullah Dadullah, the 
plan was to use Pashmul as the springboard for stepping up Taliban 
operations in the province. It does not appear to have been in any sense a 
detailed operational plan. Its grand lines featured intensifying activity in 
order to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Canadians and then 
seizing control of a section of Kandahar city, including a symbolic 
building. The aim was to demoralize Canadian public opinion, cause panic 
among Canadian politicians, and force a Canadian withdrawal, with large-
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scale political repercussions. The Taliban’s conviction that the Canadians 
could not take Pashmul derived from their belief that it was unconquerable 
and that even the Soviet army had not been able to take the area in the 
1980s.26 
 Although it appears that the plan faced opposition within the 
Taliban leadership, it was eventually approved and Dadullah was placed in 
charge. The location was chosen because of its vineyards and ditches, 
which offered cover to the Taliban. During the summer of 2006, an 
unprecedented build-up of Taliban presence in the area of Pashmul started 
taking place; bomb production workshops were established and 
fortifications were built. The plan may actually have involved luring or 
provoking the Canadians into attacking Pashmul, where terrain is more 
difficult than in the rest of Kandahar, thus getting them to fight on a 
ground of the Taliban’s choosing. As the buildup grew to hundreds and 
perhaps over a thousand Taliban, attacks in and around Kandahar 
intensified.27 
The operation started rather successfully, with the Canadians 
meeting heavy resistance and five Canadian forces quickly killed in 
action. However, the belief that Pashmul’s vegetation and ditches would 
provide cover from the air proved misplaced, as ISAF authorized 
unguided bombing over the area despite the risk of collateral damage to 
civilians. From that point onwards, the engagement was one-sided, with 
the Taliban unable to inflict significant casualties on ISAF forces. ISAF 
moved against Pashmul from Kandahar, and SOF intervened to cut off the 
withdrawal route; the Taliban could not hold the ground under heavy 
aerial bombardment and withdrew with heavy losses.  
Tactically, the engagement was a Taliban defeat. However, the 
very fact that the Taliban could engage ISAF in a conventional battle at 
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27 See Chris Wattie, Contact Charlie (Toronto: Key Porter, 2008). 
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the outskirts of Kandahar had a major propaganda impact, demonstrating 
their emergence as a major military force. It is not clear whether Pashmul 
was actually meant to have a kind of “Tet offensive” impact or whether 
that was simply achieved by chance and the operation was decided on the 
basis of an unrealistic assessment of their own capabilities vis-à-vis the 
Canadian troops. In either case, the Taliban effectively exploited the 
situation and prioritized the return of their cadres in the area of Pashmul 
after their tactical defeat, symbolizing their resilience and challenging 
ISAF’s statement of a crushing victory. After Pashmul, the Taliban’s 
influence in Kandahar province started growing steadily. 
From the Taliban perspective, the Pashmul engagement was part of 
a continuum of violence. Isolating it as a specific tactical event is therefore 
arbitrary. What turned the engagement into a strategic success for the 
Taliban was their willingness and ability to return to Pashmul within a few 
months of the battle, demonstrating that they had not been crushed.28 
However, the Taliban have not repeated operations like Pashmul after 
2006, indicating that the cost in terms of casualties was assessed to be high 
and that alternative ways of achieving similar psychological victories were 
identified. 
 
B. Operational Analysis 
Few are the occasions when the Taliban tried to organize large-
scale operations, and few are the instances in which they carefully planned 
small tactical operations (mostly in eastern Afghanistan). The battle of 
Pashmul was an exception to standard Taliban operations. Operational 
planning would normally take place within the scope of the team or front; 
the commanders would confer with each other on how to organize an 
attack or an ambush. Most fronts did not display much tactical 
sophistication, although some has been evident in the east and more 
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recently in parts of the south. Most ambushes and attacks therefore tended 
to rely on a limited number of templates. The use of IEDs, for example, is 
usually determined by the IED cell commander, who tells his men where 
and when to place them. The limited reliance on operational planning 
derives from the Taliban’s decentralized system of command, which 
forces reliance on a limited number of basic templates that are easy to use 
even by marginally skilled commanders.29 
The lack of tactical sophistication is coherent with the Taliban’s 
general military strategy, which could be described as the “war of the 
flea.”30 The main tactical points are to convey an image of readiness to 
sacrifice and resilience to the enemy, which is perceived as weakly 
motivated (both ISAF/OEF and the Afghan security forces); the actual 
tactical outcome of single engagements is less important. It is likely that 
the Taliban developed their military strategy out of an assessment of their 
tactical capabilities vis-à-vis NATO’s armies, rather than vice versa.  
Another aspect of the Taliban’s improvement between tactics and 
strategy has been their public relations campaign. It must be remembered 
that the Taliban started off their insurgency in 2002 as an utterly defeated 
and demoralized force. Their first priority was to challenge this image, and 
they received substantial support from the Pakistani Taliban in achieving 
this. Pashmul might be another example of an image-focused operation, 
although it is not clear whether it was planned as such from the beginning. 
As pointed out above, the gradual tightening of the rules of 
engagement by the Taliban is very likely related to public relations 
concerns. The development of the Taliban’s shadow governance system is 
probably also connected to similar concerns. Until 2006-07 there was little 
evidence that the Taliban were investing significant resources in it, but this 
                                                          
29 “Bigger, Badder IEDs…”; Jason Motlagh, “The Taliban's Changing, and Deadly, 
Tactics,” Time Magazine, Jul. 01, 2010; Roy Gutman, “Afghanistan War: How Taliban 
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changed as they acquired influence and control over more densely 
populated areas of the country. Whether or not the Taliban initially 
attributed much significance to their system of governors, clearly it was 
becoming a serious enterprise by 2008. In early 2010 the Taliban decided 
to appoint deputy governors at the district level, almost doubling the 
number of political cadres dedicated to shadow government tasks. Even 
the departments of education and health were reported to be active on the 
Taliban side in some areas. And in some regions the judiciary was staffed 
by real Taliban, as opposed to independent judges being sponsored by the 
Taliban, as elsewhere.31 
Much of the Taliban propaganda effort was aimed abroad, either to 
the Afghan diaspora, which was wealthy enough to contribute to the 
cause, or to sympathizers elsewhere in the Muslim world, mostly the Arab 
Gulf countries. Inside Afghanistan, word of mouth and the activities of 
political cadres remain the main vehicle of political propaganda; the 
Taliban are also adept at exploiting the free market, with propaganda 
DVDs selling well in the bazaars of southern Afghanistan and in 
Pakistan.32  
The Taliban seem, however, to have consistently opted for keeping 
the technological level of their military effort low. For example, despite 
the availability of Middle Eastern inputs that could have led to the 
adoption of more advanced technologies, the Taliban have opted to 
expand the use of IEDs quantitatively. Aware of the skills of their human 
resource pool, they have created in some areas a veritable cottage industry 
of IED production, a remarkable achievement in a cultural environment 
where manual work is not the preferred form of militant engagement. 
Similarly, the Taliban have been using more or less the same light 
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weaponry since the beginning of the war, perhaps with an increase in the 
use of recoilless guns in recent years and with the introduction of heavier 
anti-aircraft guns (14.5mm as opposed to the 12.7mm almost exclusively 
in use in the earlier years) and greater numbers of sniper rifles. Little effort 
has been made to secure more advanced weaponry on the black market, 
even when it was relatively easily available.33 These choices reflect a 
recruiting base of men with limited skills, as well as the tendency of 
commanders to view advanced and heavy weaponry as prestige weapons 
that should not be used wastefully.34 IEDs, by contrast, were used more 
effectively because nobody had an interest in treasuring them.  
Much has been said about Taliban tactics being wasteful of the 
lives of their fighters, although it has to be considered that many of the 
casualties inflicted by ISAF were Taliban allies, such as mobilized 
community youth, rather than core Taliban, particularly in southern 
Afghanistan. As a result, it is easy to overestimate Taliban losses. Still, it 
is clear that the Taliban have been willing to take heavy casualties in order 
to contest the ground with ISAF and the Afghan security forces. Not doing 
so would have hindered the Taliban’s objective to convey an image of 
aggressiveness.  
This attitude can be seen clearly in their efforts to bring the war to 
Afghanistan’s cities. This effort has achieved some startling successes in 
terms of high-profile attacks in the city center of Kabul, but it has cost the 
Taliban and their Pakistani allies heavy casualties. The hit teams, 
particularly the mixed Pakistani-Haqqani network ones, almost invariably 
got wiped out, even in the event of success.35  
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A key aspect of Taliban risk management is maintaining their 
sanctuaries in Pakistan. For example, the leadership has come under 
pressure from the Pakistani army to convince the Tehrik-I Taliban 
Pakistan (Movement of the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP) to abandon its 
stance against the Pakistani authorities; having failed that, the Taliban had 
to reluctantly distance themselves from the TTP, although they do not 
appear to have severed every contact.36 They have so far avoided openly 
declaring their rejection of the TTP, despite Pakistani insistence. In order 
to secure their sanctuaries, the Taliban cannot object too strongly to 
Pakistani directives, but at the same time they are reluctant to sever any 
link to the TTP, which according to some sources controls important 
Taliban weapon depots. Resentment against the Pakistani army and what 
the Taliban considers the army’s exploitative and opportunistic attitude 
towards them is widespread within the Taliban; the leadership, however, 
cannot afford to let this have repercussions. They tend to use soft tactics to 
resist Pakistani pressure, such as postponement and delay. In 2010, for 
example, faced with Pakistani pressure to agree with the Pakistani peace 
plan for Afghanistan, the Taliban raised issues of insufficient 
representation within the future coalition government. For the Taliban, the 
political risk deriving from a direct clash with the Pakistanis overrides any 
other consideration.37 (See Appendix F: Regional Powers and U.S./Allies.)  
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What does the Taliban do to ensure that their efforts remain 
successful in militarized zones despite centralized leadership? 
2. Have the Taliban implemented a cohesive strategy since 
2001? Who and what has been the primary driver of their strategy? 
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3. Pakistan continues to have a significant impact on the 
conflict in Afghanistan. Are there seams and gaps that can be exploited to 
diminish this influence? 
4. What mitigating factors drive cooperation and partnership 
between the Taliban and other groups? How can these be exploited by 
ISAF? 
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IV. ISAF/OEF Strategy and Taliban Adaptation 
Having underestimated the spread of the insurgency until at least 
2006, ISAF/OEF has struggled to develop a coherent counterinsurgent 
strategy. Different ISAF commanders have shifted the focus back and 
forth, sometimes placing it on close air support, sometimes on clean-up 
operations. This has been particularly problematic because they typically 
lacked the human resources to hold territories wrested from the enemy. 
The pace of formation of the Afghan security forces was increased 
gradually after 2005, but the basic structure and orientation of training 
remained the same. The army in particular was being trained as light 
infantry, mostly designed for clean-up operations. Despite their numerical 
growth, army and police still appeared rather ineffective at holding 
territory during 2010, particularly when not combined with a strong ISAF 
contingent.38 
Beginning in 2006, ISAF started experimenting with solutions to 
the problem of holding territory, mostly focusing on irregular militias or 
paramilitary forces to be based in the villages. These have run the gamut 
from Auxiliary Police to Afghan Public Protection Force to Afghan Local 
Police. Each iteration brought its own challenges, particularly on the issue 
of how the militia force could be integrated into the Afghan security 
apparatus. The idea was to tap into the same reservoir of conflict and 
rivalry among communities that the Taliban were exploiting. However, the 
problem turned out to be how to exercise a sufficient degree of command 
and control over these forces, and the Ministry of Interior repeatedly failed 
to live up to its task of supervising the militias.39 
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As a result, throughout 2002-10, the focus of ISAF’s effort has 
been luring the Taliban into a war of attrition, in which the overwhelming 
tactical superiority of American and NATO infantries coupled with close 
air support would eventually wear them down and cause them to crack. 
This was achieved by dispatching small patrols and building seemingly 
isolated outposts in enemy territory. Although the enemy reacted with 
repeated attacks and took high casualties, by 2007 it was clear that the 
Taliban was not wearing down but instead growing stronger. At this point, 
ISAF started targeting enemy commanders for killing, and from 2010, 
capture, through night raids. Although it did not reduce the Taliban’s 
numbers, this tactic seems to have achieved greater success in weakening 
the ability of the enemy to fight, since young replacement commanders did 
not usually have the same skills as their predecessors.40 
One of the reasons why the Taliban were not weakened by ISAF 
tactics until at least 2010 is their tactical adaptation and evolution. As the 
leadership observed the heavy casualties and minimal impact of their 
original attacks on patrols and outposts, it started pushing for the adoption 
of asymmetric tactics. An internal debate on the merits of the new tactics 
appears to have gone on for some time. A decision to implement them 
clearly took place in 2007, but it took several years for this to be adopted 
across the provinces, as many commanders resisted. It appears that the 
Taliban even had to create a parallel structure specializing in IEDs in 
response to the reluctance of existing commanders to integrate the IEDs in 
their operations.41 It is important to point out that the conditions of 
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utilization of IEDs in the post-2001 conflict differed markedly from the 
utilization of mines in the 1980s. In the 1980s, mines were ready-made in 
Western, Chinese, and other factories, while after 2001 the Taliban had to 
manufacture IEDs themselves. In the 1980s, the Soviets and their allies 
were not able to survey the roads and retaliate against the insurgents 
laying mines, while after 2001 drone surveillance became a major concern 
for the IED-laying teams. ISAF anti-IED technology was also much more 
sophisticated than the Soviet one. 
ISAF’s targeted killing had an impact from 2007 on Taliban 
operations; its gradual escalation in 2007-09, however, once again allowed 
the Taliban to adapt by further decentralizing their command and control, 
particularly in southern Afghanistan where most targeted killing was 
concentrated. After the targeting of Taliban commanders intensified 
greatly in 2010, the Taliban did face difficulties in adapting, particularly 
because of the sudden character of the escalation. Although the 
decentralized character of Taliban operations helped them replace 
commanders easily, their shadow governance structure, which they had 
been steadily developing since 2006, were badly damaged by the 
targeting; replacing shadow governors proved much more difficult than 
replacing military commanders.  
The role of external support in fostering Taliban adaptation is 
unclear, but there are reports that the Pakistanis increased their financial 
support in 2010. And although some IED advisers from Iraq were reported 
to be training Taliban cadres in Pakistan in 2009, the design and evolution 
of IEDs appears to mostly occur locally.42 
 
                                                          
42 “Bigger, Badder IEDs in Afghanistan,” http://defensetech.org/2010/03/16/bigger-
badder-ieds-in-afghanistan/; Paul McLeary, “Enemy Adapts To Counter IED Tactics,” 
Aviation Week, Apr 27, 2010; interviews with Taliban members and sympathizers, 2009-
10. 
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Until 2009, ISAF/OEF’s almost exclusive preoccupation has been 
with “kinetic” effects, a legacy of many years of conventional training. As 
a result, operational analysis prior to 2009 was mainly focused on how to 
improve tactics and minimize casualties, such as by feeding information to 
the US Department of Defense and the industry for the development of 
better armored vehicles. Information gathering, even of the “atmospheric” 
type, was almost non-existent until 2006 and then developed only slowly 
until 2009. Arguably, only the dramatic sacking of ISAF’s commander 
Gen. McKiernan in 2009 prompted it into a serious analytical 
reconsideration of ISAF tactics and strategies in Afghanistan. Several 
reviews, mostly ordered by Washington, took place, highlighting 
weaknesses and failures. This eventually led to a revised targeting policy, 
with greater emphasis on capturing enemy commanders alive as a source 
of information, and to a tightening of the rules of engagement in order to 
avoid civilian casualties. The practice of using patrols and isolated 
outposts as bait for the insurgents was gradually abandoned and appears to 
have outlived its usefulness.43  
The changes brought about by Gen. McChrystal in 2009 were 
more clearly based on an analysis of the Afghan environment than his 
predecessors’ changes had been; his successor, Gen. Petraeus, made 
further changes, somewhat loosening the rules of engagement and 
investing additional resources in the targeting of enemy commanders, 
particularly shadow governors. ISAF’s operational design may have been 
sound in purely military terms at this point, but its flaw remained a weak 
or nonexistent integration with the political dimensions of the conflict. 
The Helmand and Kandahar 2010 operations, for example, were 
implemented with the awareness that the government’s administration and 
police forces were not in a position to fill any gap created by ISAF in the 
enemy’s presence on the ground. Nor did the military strategy seem to 
                                                          
43 Woodward, Obama’s Wars; Hastings, “King David’s War”; personal communications 
with ISAF officers, 2010. 
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factor in the Afghan political leadership’s growing unease with 
Washington and its plans. The threat represented to the viability of Afghan 
army and police by political factionalism is similarly being conveniently 
ignored, although this arguably could represent a greater threat to the 
stability of Afghanistan than the insurgency per se.44 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Considering that ISAF and its allies are vyying for 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population, what advantages and 
opportunities can we exploit, relative to the insurgents’ culnerabilities, to 
encourage strategic, operational, and tactical success? 
2. How and why did post-2007 Taliban forces grow stronger 
from an increase in the use of close air support and the build-up of combat 
outposts? Other than IEDs, what asymmetrical strategies were employed 
by the Taliban? 
 
 
A. Operation Mushtarak 
A good example of ISAF’s new and improved operational 
planning is Operation Mushtarak, which began in February 2010. The 
operation included a lengthy planning process and was in many ways the 
most ambitious operation planned by ISAF up to that point. Mushtarak 
was considered by ISAF and by many external observers as a major 
improvement on previous efforts, in particular because of the extensive 
preparations made both for the operation and for holding the ground 
afterwards. In order to establish a government presence as soon as possible 
in the area targeted by the operation (the town of Marja in Nad-i Ali 
district), efforts were made to recruit experienced government 
administrators for the task, albeit with limited results. Mobile police units 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
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(ANCOP), better trained than the standard Uniformed Police, were 
deployed to hold territory after the cleaning phase was over, although even 
in this case they performed below expectations. Information gathering 
before the operation was extensive, with the result that that ISAF was 
better informed about the area and the Taliban operating there than on 
previous occasions. It seems to have missed the presence of an 
underground network of Taliban, however, which harassed ISAF troops 
for several months after the successful roll out, even in the little town of 
Marja itself. 45 
  
B. ISAF and Its Adaptation After 2009 
From 2002-09, ISAF gave the impression of being more concerned 
with the safety of its own soldiers than with the achievement of strategic 
military and political goals or with the safety of Afghan civilians. The 
accusations in this regard might be unfair (on a historical scale, ISAF is 
probably one of the best behaved occupation forces ever) but must be seen 
as part of the operating environment. The effort to impose tighter and 
tighter rules of engagement has been going in the direction of factoring in 
these types of concerns, but the intermediate and lower levels of command 
within ISAF have not been fully cooperative in this effort. Resentment 
among junior officers for what they felt were excessively tight rules of 
engagement probably contributed to Gen. Petraeus’s decision to relax 
them somewhat when he took over in 2010.46 
Post-2009, ISAF/OEF’s operational planning was much more 
sophisticated and professional than the Taliban’s; almost invariably, this 
resulted in ISAF/OEF’s forces emerging victorious from engagements. 
                                                          
45 See, among others, Jeffrey Dressler, Operation Moshtarak (Washington: Institute for 
the Study of War, 2010). 
46 Erica Gaston, “The War Over Afghan Civilian Casualties,” Foreign Policy: The Afpak 
Channel, March 8, 2011; Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspective on Operations of Pro-
Government Forces in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, 2008). 
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Even in those instances where unexpected Taliban resistance was met, the 
post-2009 version of ISAF/OEF had the ability to rapidly adapt their 
operations to the new challenge, as in the case of Pashmul discussed 
above. This was due to their sophisticated command and control structure, 
even if the multitude of daily tactical situations made it easier to exercise 
command in serious engagements than control in all circumstances.47  
In contrast to the Taliban, ISAF/OEF have been consistently well 
resourced, especially since 2009. ISAF was deploying 32,000 to 33,000 
combat troops by the end of 2010, which together with about 70,000 
Afghan soldiers and 60,000 police in the field were facing a maximum of 
40,000 full-time insurgents. This is far from the 10:1 superiority 
recommended by counterinsurgency textbooks to achieve a decisive 
numerical advantage. Such superiority is probably unachievable, however: 
ISAF’s troop commitments are only likely to decline in the future, and the 
attrition rates of the Afghan forces (32 percent for the army and 23 percent 
for the police as of February 2011) will prevent those forces from growing 
indefinitely. The NATO Training Mission started talking in 2010 about 
forming a new leadership for the Afghan security forces, but they did not 
have a viable plan to achieve that quickly enough as of 2011.48 
Only since 2009 has ISAF/OEF demonstrated an ability to adapt to 
the challenges posed by the insurgency. The weaknesses of the Taliban 
have been known for a long time; monitoring Taliban communications 
                                                          
47 Personal communication with ISAF officers and civilian officials, 2008-10. The way 
ISAF/OEF developed their military strategy was, until 2009, similar to the Taliban’s: out 
of their tactical self-confidence and awareness of their extreme superiority, a strategy was 
developed which attempted to maximize those tactical advantages. However, at least until 
2009, this tactically driven strategy had little chance of succeeding, as the insurgents 
generally had the tactical initiative against a force mix which was conventional to over 95 
percent and only marginally composed of SOF. There was little to prevent insurgents to 
engage tactically only when it suited them and break off every time the odds were not in 
their favor.  
48 John Wendle, “Fighting The Taliban: Afghan Army Faces Attrition Crisis,” Time 
Magazine, 2 March 2011. 
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highlighted their crisis of growth in 2007 as well as the crisis of discipline 
in late 2008, when the Taliban could not effectively control the mass of 
new recruits flocking to the movement, particularly in Kabul’s region. But 
whether ISAF really acquired an ability to seize any opportunity offered 
by weaknesses shown by their enemy in 2010-11 is not clear. Tactically, 
ISAF certainly acquired greater flexibility with the arrival of a large SOF 
contingent in 2010 and has been pursuing the Taliban relentlessly in a 
number of provinces. The expanding SOF contingent allowed ISAF to 
bring the war to the Taliban’s turf in the mountains and therefore wrest the 
initiative away from them.  
Strategically, ISAF’s military focus remained a problem. The need 
of a political approach to the insurgency was still generally understood as 
offering some form of reintegration path to surrendering Taliban. The 
continued reliance on foreign troops to bring pressure on the insurgents 
has had significant costs in terms of public relations, particularly inside 
Afghanistan, and has made an improvement in the perception of foreign 
troops and of their role difficult to achieve.49 
 
C. Taliban in Kunduz 2006–2010 
One way to illustrate these trends of interaction, adaptation, and 
reassessment is to focus on a particular example. The Taliban in Kunduz 
from 2006-2010 provides just such a strategic and operational overview, 
with the added benefit of an operationally and strategically successful 
ending. This vignette suggests two important lessons in countering 
interaction and adaptation: disruption operations and counternetwork 
operations can have operational and strategic effects; and, when the 
pressure was off the Taliban in this region, they lost their adaptive 
capabilities and their skills eroded over time.  
                                                          
49 Hastings, “King David’s War”; David Isby, Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires (New 
York: Pegasus Books, 2010): 291. 
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The appearance of the Taliban in Kunduz was the result of long 
and determined efforts that started in 2006 with the dispatch of political 
agents tasked to contact locals and particularly former members of the 
movement and convince them to join the insurgency. These efforts were 
not successful initially, but by 2008 their persistence was beginning to pay 
off, and the Taliban managed to mobilize a new generation of young 
fighters. A veritable mass mobilization occurred in 2009 within some 
Pashtun communities of the province, particularly in Chardara district. 
Riding this wave of popular support, the Taliban managed to bring the war 
to almost every corner of this multi-ethnic province, invading Tajik, 
Uzbek and Turkmen areas. Although the Taliban could recruit a few Tajik 
commanders on their side, by and large the Taliban of Kunduz remained a 
Pashtun movement. Their encroachment on non-Pashtun territory brought 
about a reaction by what was left of the old militias of Jamiat-i Islami, 
Junbesh-i Milli-ye Islami, and other groups, which remobilized to push the 
Taliban back. The situation had stabilized by early 2010, with the Taliban 
in control of most Pashtun villages and the militias in control of most of 
the Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkmen villages.  
The Taliban’s luck, however, was about to run out. US SOF 
entered the scene during the summer and autumn of 2010, hitting the local 
Taliban very hard and virtually exterminating their local leadership. The 
Taliban in Kunduz had not been under heavy pressure before, since the 
local ISAF-German garrison had not been proactive in fighting them and 
the Afghan police was also ineffective. This sudden escalation not only 
decapitated the network locally but also threw the Taliban itself into 
disarray. They had become used to dictating the pace and timing of 
conflict in the region; the speed and ferocity of the SOF attacks disrupted 
this cozy situation.  
The Taliban’s strategic and operational decision making process is 
not particularly fast, not least because decisions are usually taken after 
debates and require consensus. Up until this point, however, they had 
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certainly seemed to have been faster in taking decisions than Kabul, ISAF, 
or Washington (or to be more precise, the combination of them). The 
Taliban’s decision making and lengthy processes of implementation has 
been highlighted as a particular weakness. This was not a problem until 
2009, when ISAF became more proactive and the Taliban struggled to 
keep up with the pace. Unable to adapt quickly in Kunduz, the Taliban 
started losing ground, and even the Afghan police was able to regain the 
initiative against them. With the exception of some of the better trained, 
more radical Taliban groups, supported by foreign elements, who tried to 
fight back, the bulk of the Taliban had surrendered or fled Kunduz by 
February 2011.50 
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V. Conclusion 
Insurgencies are dynamic processes of adaptation and 
counteradaptation. There should always be an expectation that insurgents 
will try to adapt to whatever counterinsurgency effort is mobilized against 
them; while demanding a major investment of energy and resources, 
adaptation might actually ending up making the insurgents stronger. Any 
counterinsurgency effort should therefore be based on an assessment of 
the insurgents’ capabilities and potential. The counterinsurgent should be 
careful about not pushing the insurgency down a road that, although 
difficult to pursue, might turn it into a superior organization. As of 2011, 
the indications were that the growing pressure exercised on the Taliban 
might be achieving exactly that, while the Kabul government forces, 
sheltered by a massive international presence, failed to keep the pace.  
Tactical encounters in a guerrilla war do not have the same 
significance as they have in a conventional conflict: they are not primarily 
meant to defeat the enemy militarily or achieve strict military aims. What 
the insurgents try to achieve by challenging the enemy militarily is to 
show that the monopoly of violence has been broken and that there is 
competition over who is the legitimate government of the country. 
Tactical encounters, therefore, have a symbolic significance, particularly 
when the enemy is widely perceived as being far superior in terms of 
resources and technology, which is certainly the case in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, indulging in the celebration of tactical successes, while useful 
to boost the morale of the conventional army facing the insurgency, is 
misleading in terms of analyzing the dynamics of the conflict. The 
thinking has to be in terms of the impact on local perceptions: whom the 
villagers see as the dominant force locally. Tactical encounters are only 
the tip of an iceberg of activities that include armed propaganda, 
intimidation, coercion, population control, and administration, which 
military intelligence agencies often fail to detect or detect belatedly.  
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Discussion Questions 
1. What factors contribute to the success or failure of armed 
groups in general? 
2. What distinctive or unique approaches have the Taliban 
implemented to make their legacy successful? 
3. The Taliban’s strong point of decentralization is also a 
weakness. Apart from targeted killings, how can ISAF and its allies 
exploit that weakness? 
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Annex A: Historical Context 
 
Politically, Afghanistan was largely stable in the 1970s before the 
1978 Communist coup, although not completely calm. Some small 
Maoist-leaning groups challenged government control in the Shamali 
region and other areas just north of Kabul but did not pose a serious threat. 
The Maoists recruited educated and semi-educated people who were often 
discriminated against within the government, especially Hazaras and 
Shiites. The pro-Soviet leftists were strong in the army and in the state 
bureaucracy, but weak in the villages. They did recruit many teachers, 
however, gaining some influence among the rural population. The 
Islamists recruited among the upper middle class for the sympathies of the 
urban population, sometimes in competition with pro-Soviet leftists, but 
had greater success in attracting young men of rural origins who were 
disturbed by the relative progressiveness of cities like Kabul and 
Jalalabad, where the universities were based. They tried to organize an 
uprising in select rural areas in 1975 but failed miserably. By 1978 they 
were a marginal force, with perhaps one thousand or so activists, most of 
whom were in exile in Pakistan.51 
The Muslim clergy, who would play a very important role in the 
jihad movement, were quiet and fragmented in many local networks, 
without a real national leadership or an ability to mobilize nationally. 
Tribes and communities were also quiet and no local revolts were 
recorded during the 1970s, as the central state had convincingly 
demonstrated its willingness to repress any revolt ruthlessly.52 
                                                          
51 A. Giustozzi, “Transition Without End,” working paper (London: Crisis States 
Research Centre, 2009); A. Guistozzi Empires of Mud (London: Hurst, 2009); Richard H. 
Shultz Jr. and Andrea J Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias (New York: Colombia 
University Press, 2006): Chapter 6. 
52 A. Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (London: Curzon, 1995). 
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The Communist government that seized power in 1978 ignited the 
conflict by antagonizing the more conservative strata of the population as 
well as the new Islamist-leaning Pakistani regime of Gen. Zia-ul Haq.53 
The leftists launched land reform and a series of progressive initiatives 
concerning female emancipation, which created turmoil and some violent 
resistance. The regime reacted indiscriminately and set out to wipe out the 
top layers of the clergy and tribal aristocracy, believing that they had a 
hand in organizing the resistance. The armed forces often reacted brutally 
to attacks on party activists and state officials, bombing villages.  
Rather than weakening the opposition, this indiscriminate 
overreaction energized it. Many thought that the regime was out to 
exterminate all perceived opposition, and Afghans felt driven to fight out 
of fear of being caught in the repression. The Soviet intervention at the 
end of 1979 was meant to stabilize the new regime, reorganize the security 
forces, and leave as quickly as possible. Instead, the regeneration of the 
Afghan armed forces proved a more complicated task than they had 
expected, as Soviet presence in the country aroused even further 
opposition and the Soviets were caught in the conflict.54  
 
The Mujahideen “Way of War” in the 1980s 
In 1978-80, it was common to observe Afghan Pashtun 
communities mobilize tribal lashkars (tribal armies) and move against 
government compounds with frontal, ill-organized attacks. The 
appearance of Soviet air power and relatively well-directed artillery fire 
made this tactic suicidal and triggered the evolution of the resistance. 
Although the lashkars allowed tribal leadership to maintain control over 
                                                          
53 Shahid Jared Burki and Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of 
Zia-ul Haq (Lahore: Westview Press, 1991); Craig Baxter, ed. Zia’s Pakistan (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1985). 
54 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending; G. Feifer, The Great Gamble (New York: Harper 
Collins, 2009); A. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
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the mass of the tribesmen, they were unsuitable against the Soviets. This 
failure paved the way for guerrilla war, which undermined tribal 
leadership’s ability to maintain control, as the tribal elders had little 
relevant experience in this field and little understanding of the need for 
tactical adaptation, such as small unit tactics, underground work, and so 
forth.  
At the start of the conflict, the jihadist opposition—calling itself 
the mujahideen or holy warriors—was decentralized and disorganized. 
Most of the armed groups were formed locally and mobilized by local 
communities, landlords, and strongmen. Organized Islamist input was 
marginal. After the intervention of the Soviet army, the mujahideen began 
adapting to new circumstances and a more challenging environment. This 
was facilitated by the desertion to the resistance of a number of Afghan 
army officers and the provision of training by the Pakistani army.55 
All of these issues played in favor of the emergence of a new class 
of military professionals. The mujahideen originally came from social 
groups who had experience in either military tactics or underground work: 
former military personnel, political activists, and bandits. Over time, the 
most apt of these young men and boys who had joined the fight in 1978-
1980 rose up the ranks of the opposition and attained leadership positions. 
This new social group gradually became a new social class, one with little 
memory of pre-war ways of life and a high awareness of their own 
importance. The original leadership, rooted in the roles they played as 
civilians before the outbreak of the conflict, was marginalized in most of 
the country.56 
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In terms of tactical evolution, the mujahideen developed or refined 
guerrilla tactics and shaped their organization around their commanders.57 
From the squad leader to the front commander, the commanders became 
the core structure of virtually all the resistance groups and parties. At the 
local level, organizations became dependent on charismatic leaders who 
built armed groups around themselves and maintained full control over 
them. Little organizational development took place beyond this. The main 
exception was Hizb-i Islami, the main Islamist organization in the conflict, 
which tried to develop a sophisticated structure of centralized control. It 
established a UHF radio network, employed a kind of political commissar, 
and created a relatively complex bureaucracy in Pakistan to oversee the 
whole effort.58 But even Hizb-i Islami struggled to implement its own 
strategy of creating a centralized insurgency, mainly due to the shortage of 
educated cadres.59 In the absence of a political structure to support the 
resistance, the commanders started turning into “new khans,” assuming 
the role of local strongmen and prioritizing local concerns and interests at 
the expense of any national strategy or aims.60 
                                                          
57 In most of Afghanistan by 1978, several generations had lived without having had any 
experience of warfare, except for compulsory military service. There was only a fading 
memory of how the previous wars had been fought; moreover, the military environment 
of the 1980s was different from that of the Anglo-Afghan Wars, for example, in 
particular due to the role of air power. For details see Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J 
Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, Ch. 6. 
58 For short profiles, see “Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin” (Washington: Institute for the Study 
of War, 2010) http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/hezb-e-islami-gulbuddin-
hig; Omid Marzaban, “Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. 4 issue 18 
(2006); Muhammad Tahir, “Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Return to the Afghan Insurgency,” 
Terrorism Monitor Vol. 6 issue 11(2008). 
59 Hizb-i Islami’s structure was best developed where it could recruit sufficient numbers 
of such cadres, such as in Parwan and Kapisa provinces, in parts of Kabul province, in 
Wardak, Logar and parts of Nangarhar. It never had great success in the tribal areas of the 
southeast or in the west nor in northern Afghanistan, where few educated cadres were 
available. 
60 Giustozzi, Empires of Mud; the author’s interviews with former mujahideen 
commanders, 2007-9. 
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The initial Soviet units that moved into Afghanistan at the end of 
1979 were constituted of reserve forces mobilized in the Turkestan 
military region. These were some of the weakest units of the whole Soviet 
army, and their capabilities in terms of counterguerrilla operations were 
very limited. Starting in 1980, however, the Soviet army replaced the 
Central Asian reservists with better trained conscripts and an increasing 
number of Special Forces (Spetsnaz). Close air support improved with the 
deployment of growing numbers of Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships, 
which were also assigned to the Afghan air force in substantial numbers, 
and Su-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft, which proved effective and 
were even used to deliver laser-guided bombs.61  
More important than the military dimension of the Soviet-Afghan 
counterinsurgency, however, was the political-intelligence dimension. The 
KGB rebuilt Afghan intelligence from scratch and allowed it to take 
control of most of the counterinsurgency effort. The main features of this 
effort included a larger and larger special force command under the 
Afghan Intelligence Service (Khadamat-i Atala’at-i Dawlati, or KhAD) 
that eventually relied on 60 battalions, thousands of political agents 
around the country, and the creation of a large militia force. The purpose 
of these units was to bring the war to the villages, the home turf of the 
insurgents, and to identify divisions and weaknesses within the ranks of 
the opposition.  
The evolution of the Soviet-Afghan effort increased pressure on 
the insurgents; although the Spetsnaz were never able to completely close 
the supply lines coming from Pakistan, they were able to assist in partially 
choking off supplies to northern Afghanistan. This was the first region of 
Afghanistan where the pro-Soviet government began to gain the upper 
hand in 1985. The militias helped to marginalize the mujahideen in the 
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north and later also in the west. KhAD political agents succeeded in 
reducing the level of opposition in Kandahar as well as some other areas.62  
The mujahideen struggled to adapt to this combination of military 
and political tactics; many chose instead to come to terms with the 
government and sign ceasefires or switch sides. A minority of mujahideen, 
however, did adapt, often driven by ideology, and that was enough to 
maintain a degree of threat even in the areas where the pro-Soviet 
government was strongest. Militarily, the mujahideen increasingly relied 
on Western manufactured and undetectable mines, anti-tank weaponry 
(eventually including guided missiles), long-range rockets and mortars, 
and anti-aircraft weaponry to counterbalance the technological escalation 
taking place on the government side. Tactical skills also evolved, mostly 
in specific areas and under specific commanders. Some commanders grew 
into regional commanders, able to coordinate operations on a large scale; 
their ability to mobilize junior commanders was always limited, even 
where the process went further, such as around Panjshir (Commander 
Ahmad Shah Massud) and around Herat (Commander Ismail Khan).63 
The final collapse of the pro-Soviet regime was not the result of a 
mujahideen victory, but of the collapse of the regime’s source of 
patronage, the Soviet Union. Fragments of the regime’s militias and 
different factions of the mujahideen then confronted each other in a civil 
war that began in 1992 with occasional flareups of fighting and quickly 
degenerated into full-scale conflict. This phase consisted of a civil war 
among factions of similar strength, so we shall not examine it in detail. 
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What was going on was semi-regular militias, initially with the 
incorporation of some units of what had been the regular army of the pro-
Soviet regime, confronting each other over the control of roads and urban 
centers.  
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Annex B: Afghanistan’s Economic Environment 
 
The assumption that simply pumping resources into a post-conflict 
country helps address problems quickly has been proven wrong, 
particularly in Afghanistan. The roots of this problem were created during 
the Soviet-Afghan conflict and have been exacerbated by more than 30 
years of conflict. The bubble economy created after 2001 is important 
because it divided the country between the beneficiaries of the new 
setup—relatively few—and a majority who lost out because a massive 
inflationary process eroded their purchasing power. It also insulated the 
Afghan government from its natural constituency, the Afghan population.  
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, Afghanistan’s economy was very 
underdeveloped. State control discouraged private initiative and little 
financial accumulation occurred; the banking system was also state 
controlled. The government was dependent on external assistance for its 
development efforts, which primarily consisted of infrastructure extension 
as well as a few extractive and industrial projects; these were mostly run 
inefficiently and did not contribute significantly to state revenue. The state 
had gradually abandoned direct taxation after World War II, relying 
instead on custom revenues. This had a greater degree of cost 
effectiveness but also insulated the state from society, making it more 
resilient to turmoil and less responsive than ever to demands coming from 
society. This tendency was reinforced by the impact of external assistance, 
mostly of Soviet origin, with American help a close second.64  
From 1978 onwards, Afghanistan’s economy was transformed in a 
number of ways. A war economy developed in which the government was 
completely dependent on Soviet hand-outs and the opposition depended 
on American and Arab support; smuggling networks developed rapidly 
during the 1980s and by the 1990s were ready to provide sources of 
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revenue to factions in a civil war that regional powers and superpowers 
had little or no interest in supporting financially. Even the Saudis, 
Pakistanis, and Iranians, who kept supporting their Afghan allies in the 
1990s, were nowhere as lavish in their support as they had been in the 
1980s. 65 
The Taliban similarly received some support from abroad, but 
mostly relied on revenue they could raise through taxation and customs. 
By de facto legalizing the smuggling networks and taxing them, they 
raised sufficient revenue to run their own state administration, admittedly 
on the cheap.66  
From 2001 onwards the situation again resembled that of the 
1980s, with external aid and expenditure overshadowing anything else, 
except perhaps a booming narcotics trade. The bubbles created by aid 
money and direct expenditures of foreign armies and civilian agencies 
drove massive economic growth, with the building and contracting 
industries in particular growing multifold. Afghanistan’s industrial sector 
and agriculture lagged behind; the high costs of labor and energy made it 
difficult for Afghan entrepreneurs to sell locally manufactured products 
competitively. 
The insulation of the government from society was consolidated by 
a level of external financial inflows that far exceeded previous levels in 
real terms; however, the effects of these high levels of expenditure 
percolated down to society in a number of ways. First, employment was 
created, at least in the cities, drawing villagers away from the countryside; 
the rising cost of living also provided an incentive to either find salaried 
employment or rely on cash crops such as poppies. Although corruption 
was already in expansion in the 1990s, the new wealth further stimulated 
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the corruption of government officials, whose salaries were no longer 
sufficient to afford a decent lower-middle-class standard of living.  
Perhaps the most significant impact was the changing mentality of 
the upper strata of the rural population. Those with resources were now 
less interested in redistribution and in developing a retinue of followers 
than in investing in profitable ventures, where returns were often 
exceptionally high, particularly for those well-connected to the Afghan 
government or foreign agencies. In a sense, capitalism arrived in 
Afghanistan for the first time, with a deep transformative impact that, in 
the short term, undermined a system of government based on the influence 
of elders and on some residual ability of communities to administer 
themselves.67 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. How could the Afghan government compete with the 
heavy-handed Taliban for tax revenue? 
2. What provisions could the Afghan central bank make to 
inhibit the Taliban from collecting taxes from communities? 
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Annex C: Afghanistan—A Fragmented Society 
 
The impact of external support on a society fragmented to start 
with and further fragmented by more than 20 years of war has been to 
excite rivalries and jealousies. The urban/rural divide and the role of the 
clergy are essential to understanding mobilization on the insurgents’ side. 
A fragmented society with only limited experience of successful state-
building in the past is particularly difficult to handle for any outside actors 
intervening in support of whichever elite is currently claiming to be the 
Afghan government.  
Afghanistan has always been very fragmented socially due to the 
coexistence within its boundaries of many different communities, the 
weak central state, and the limited economic development that never 
managed to merge the communities into a national whole. There are an 
estimated 400 Pashtun tribes, each further sub-divided into rival 
communities and clans, and thousands of non-Pashtun communities, often 
distinct unto themselves. To the extent that economic and social 
development has taken place, it only had an impact in terms of merging 
communities in the cities, and even that was negatively affected by 30 
years of internal conflict and the breakdown of the state in the 1990s. In 
these early stages of economic and social development, the impact has 
been to further complicate Afghanistan’s fragmentation by creating social 
interest groups that intertwine with communities, ethnic groups, and tribes 
rather than combine them.68  
Even a simplified picture of Afghan society shows that 
communities vary greatly in terms of their internal organization. In the 
southeast and in remote areas of the south and east, tribes have maintained 
their functionality, have leadership capable of mobilizing the community 
for collective action, and are quite autonomous from the Afghan state. 
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Around the main cities and highways of the south and east, however, 
tribes have lost this ability and often maintain little more than a residual 
form of identity that some politicians try to tap into for political 
mobilization through the distribution of favors and patronage. In such 
areas, any collective action happens at the sub-tribal level, typically in 
communities of villages relatively isolated from other components of 
Afghan society. 
 Similarly, non-Pashtun communities tend to have a capacity for 
collective action when they are remote from the cities, but this can be 
implemented through different systems of self-organization. In some cases 
(Badakhshan, Hazarajat, Uzbek communities of northern Afghanistan), 
mobilization is achieved through a strongman who has the physical force 
and the resources to mobilize a retinue of armed men; this mobilization 
typically is not as inclusive as in Pashtun tribes. 
In other cases, a collective leadership of elders can mobilize the 
youth (Tajik areas north of Kabul). Often the system is mixed: the elders 
have a say but only a strongman can effectively mobilize people. In part, 
these social structures existed before the war; however, 30 years of war 
have created a new class of “military leaders” or strongmen who in the 
presence of a weak state have been able to assume control of many 
communities or have gained a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
elders.69 According to the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) 
database, maintained by Afghanistan New Beginning Program (ANBP) 
and the Disarmament Commission, there were 5,557 illegal armed groups 
as of late 2006.70 The number might actually be higher now due to 
widespread insecurity. Strongmen with an armed retinue thus are a feature 
of the Afghan social landscape that is not going to disappear soon. 
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The urbanization of Afghanistan has further complicated this 
picture. All the main Afghan cities (Kabul, Herat, Mazar-I Sharif, 
Kandahar, and Jalalabad) have, to various degrees, been swollen by a 
wave of migrants from the villages as well as recent immigrants, mostly 
refugees from Pakistan and Iran. This wave has diluted the urban character 
of the cities, which had already been weakened during the war by 
successive waves of emigration of middle- and upper-class citizens. 
Generally speaking, the urban population is demoralized and not very 
active politically; they feel betrayed by the government but rarely have 
sympathy for the armed opposition. Heavily rigged elections have kept 
almost all of the urban intelligentsia out of parliament.  
Finally, the importance of the Islamic clergy in Afghanistan cannot 
be underestimated. At the start of the 30 years of conflict, it was estimated 
that clerics and other religious figures (saints, holy figures, etc.) comprised 
about 2 percent of the population. That percentage is likely to have grown 
because of increased recruitment to religious schools in the 1980s, when 
the state educational system was pushed out of the villages and Arab 
countries funded a massive expansion of religious education for Afghans 
in Pakistan. Typically, the Afghan clergy has always been fragmented in 
small local networks, with just the mystic Sufi orders (Naqshandiyya, 
Qadiriyya, and Chestiyya) being organized in wider (but never truly 
national) networks. The emergence of clerical resistance parties in the 
1980s (such as Harakat-e Enqelab among the Sunnis) helped unify various 
small clerical networks into a wider organization. The next crucial passage 
in the emergence of the clergy as a “social class” with strong political 
ambitions was the Taliban government of 1996-2001, which exerted a 
great effort to mobilize clerical networks countrywide to support the new 
government and represent it at the local level. The Taliban obtained a fair 
degree of success; however, not all clerical networks were responsive. In 
particular, Sufis tended not to link with the Taliban. The experience of 
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power and influence of the clergy in this period explain the later nostalgia 
for the Taliban among many mullahs.71  
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Urbanized Afghans are typically the most educated and 
prosperous in Afghanistan. They are also the least active in the 
government, the military, and the insurgency. How has ISAF and the U.S. 
marginalized this group since 2001? What can be done to gain their 
support? 
2. What role has patrimolialism played in governance? Is this 
form of rule justified, consdering the historical clan/tribe system of 
governance? 
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Annex D: Other Insurgent and Pro-Government Groups 
 
A. Insurgent Armed Groups 
Hizb-i Islami is the second-largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, 
accounting for perhaps 10 percent of the strength of the insurgency. Many 
former fighters of Hizb-i Islami or their relatives also fight in the ranks of 
the Taliban, particularly in areas where Hizb-i Islami has no organized 
presence. It operates mostly in eastern Afghanistan, reaching out to some 
areas around Kabul and the southeast. Hizb-i Islami’s relations with the 
Taliban are often troubled, and the two groups have fought each other in 
the recent past; as of early 2011 they seem to have patched up their 
differences and are fighting together again.72 Hizb-i Islami’s strategy 
appears easier to analyze than the Taliban’s. It does not have the financial 
resources to compete with the Taliban for the leadership of the insurgency, 
and its aim has been to enhance its military strength gradually in order to 
gain leverage at the negotiating table once time is ripe for an agreement. 
Hizb-i Islami could not afford to negotiate separately, because the 
Pakistanis oppose such a move and because the Taliban would not have 
much leverage in such a case. Hizb-I Islami does not want a military 
victory for the Taliban. Ideally, the party maneuvers for a political deal, 
where its role would be maximized.73 
Various Salafi (Islamic fundamentalist) groups exist in eastern 
Afghanistan, particularly in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, and some have 
declared a jihad against the government and the foreign armies. Although 
Salafism is predominant at the popular level in these two provinces, the 
Salafis’ military role is marginal. In the past they had troubled relations 
with both Hizb-i Islami and Taliban, but seemed in early 2011 to operate 
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together with them.74 They account for less than 1 percent of the 
insurgency. 
Al Qaida had a small presence in Afghanistan by late 2010, with 
probably tens rather than hundreds of cadres operating in Afghan territory. 
These cadres operated mainly as advisers, specialists, and trainers, giving 
them a greater value than their small numbers would suggest. Al Qaida 
cooperated closely with the Taliban, or at least selected commanders, but 
ceased sending relatively large teams of fighters into Afghanistan, in part 
because of the negative reactions that groups of foreign fighters were 
eliciting from both the general population and Taliban fighters alike.75 It is 
difficult to judge Al Qaida’s strategy in Afghanistan, but certainly they 
oppose negotiations and will try to do whatever they can to sabotage them. 
Their likely strategy is to keep the Afghan front open as long as possible 
in order to weaken the American enemy and prevent a future intervention 
in the Arab world.  
Several Pakistani jihadist organizations fight from time to time in 
Afghan territory, most typically some factions of the Pakistani Taliban and 
Lashkar-e Taiba; their men are usually found not far from the Pakistani 
border. Their numbers vary greatly depending on the season and 
developments in Pakistan itself; on average their strength can be estimated 
around 3 to 4 percent of the insurgency as a whole, that is, never 
exceeding 2,000.76 Pakistani jihadist groups are certainly more exposed to 
Pakistani pressure and might to a large extent share Pakistan’s goals in 
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Afghanistan; they would support a negotiated settlement if that was 
sponsored by the Pakistanis.  
Central Asian jihadist movements are increasingly found in 
northern Afghanistan, where they appear to have been integrated into the 
Taliban structure and work to recruit young Afghan Uzbeks to the cause. 
The fighting strength of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the largest 
of these groups) is probably no more than 1 percent of the strength of the 
insurgency.77 They have shown no interest in a peace that could deny them 
access to Central Asia. The presence of Chechens is reported, although 
they are more likely to be tens than hundreds; they tend to serve as trainers 
and weapons specialists. 
There are also some independent Afghan jihadists, who are not 
affiliated with any organization. They seem relatively abundant in western 
Afghanistan, where some receive support from Iran. On the whole, they 
probably do not account for more than 2 percent to 3 percent of the 
strength of the insurgency.78 
Among the opposition groups, Hizb-i Islami is most likely to 
attract portions of the educated class, although the Taliban are also known 
to have made an effort. This radical Islamist group has been recruiting 
among university students since the 1970s and continues to do so. If the 
armed opposition attracts urban dwellers in any numbers, they are likely to 
come from the youth. Taliban presence and recruitment is reported in most 
universities, while Hizb-i Islami is strong among students, particularly in 
Jalalabad. There is also a stream of Taliban recruits among the non-
educated urban youth, but these are mostly recent immigrants into the 
cities, who remain socially marginalized and have also been culturally 
alienated by the contrast between urban and rural mores.79 
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B. Pro-Government Armed Groups 
The most significant armed groups emerging from Operation 
Enduring Freedom were Jamiat-i Islami, Junbesh-i Milli-ye Islami, and 
Hizb-i Wahdat. Jamiat-i Islami is a moderate Islamist group led by 
Professor Rabbani, loosely organized around a collection of strongmen, 
and mostly composed of Tajiks from the northeastern, western, and 
northern regions as well as the central region around Kabul; from 2002 
onwards it has shown a tendency towards internal fragmentation. Junbesh-
i Milli-ye Islami is a secular group gathered around Gen. Dostum, mostly 
composed of Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan and with regionalist 
claims; this group also has been weakening politically and militarily in 
recent years and has suffered many defections. Hizb-i Wahdat is a Shiite 
group originally of Khomeninist inclinations and then increasingly driven 
by Hazara nationalism, based in central Afghanistan; this group has 
splintered into several rival factions. 
Many local military leaders linked to the factions above are now 
on the loose and dedicated to criminal activities; some collaborate with the 
insurgency. The best-known example is Ghulam Yahya, a former 
commander of Jamiat in Herat, who until his death in fall 2009 was 
emerging as the leading Taliban commander in the province. Among 
Pashtuns, pro-government armed groups have almost entirely been 
absorbed into the police. Some local military leaders have been 
incorporated in a range of government-sponsored militias that started 
forming in 2009.80  
Several other groups were minor players in terms of their influence 
and military power. Probably over 6,000 inactive militias are currently 
present in the country, often indistinguishable from criminal gangs. 
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Hundreds of private security companies exist with anywhere between 
40,000 to 70,000 armed guards, many of whom are unregistered. 
Afghanistan’s police are often staffed by militias linked to political 
factions, especially but not exclusively in southern Afghanistan. These 
police-militias are often keen enemies of the Taliban, but are undisciplined 
and can have a contentious relationship with local people, which 
contributes to increasing hostility toward the government amongst the 
population.81 
The Afghan army is considered by many sources—government, 
military, and local populations—to be more disciplined than the police, 
although many of its officers do have a background in the anti-Taliban 
factions and maintain some allegiance to them. The militias have not been 
able to infiltrate the army, and former militiamen have only been admitted 
on an individual basis. Although the army’s interaction with the local 
population is not nearly as difficult as the police force’s, questions about 
their motivation to fight have been raised. Moreover, the Afghan army is 
completely dependent on ISAF’s support, both in terms of logistics and 
firepower (close air support) and, more worrying, for leadership rather 
than just advice or training. This makes their sustainability after ISAF’s 
withdrawal difficult to predict.82 
 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. Considering the wide array of ideologically and 
opportunistically driven combatants in Afghanistan, including Chechens, 
Pakistani proxy groups, various Taliban offshoots, Iranian paramilitants, 
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Al Qaeda, Hizbi-i Islami and the Haqqani network, what opportunities 
exist for exploiting said combatants’ seams and gaps? 
2. What has been the impact of other armed opposition groups 
on the Taliban’s strategy, identity, and influence? 
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Annex E: The Afghan Government 
The Bonn Agreement and the Ruling Coalition 
The 2001 Bonn agreement (officially the Agreement on 
Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions) was reached as the Taliban regime 
was being overthrown by a joint offensive of US forces and anti-Taliban 
factions. The agreement established an interim government, the Afghan 
Interim Authority, which had a six-month mandate, which was supposed 
to be followed by a two-year transitional authority. The new interim 
authority featured a coalition among all anti-Taliban groups. The most 
prominent was Jamiat-i Islami, which had already taken military control of 
Kabul as well as portions of northeastern, northern, central, and eastern 
Afghanistan. The Jamiatis agreed to Hamid Karzai taking the interim 
presidency, probably because they judged him a weak pliable figurehead 
whom they could control and use in handling the Pashtun half of the 
population, among which they had little influence.83  
However, the Bonn coalition started disintegrating relatively 
rapidly, with significant tensions emerging as early as 2002. Karzai and 
his closest allies, encouraged by their Western allies, moved to gradually 
expand their influence and break up Jamiat’s monopoly over the security 
sector. From 2003 onwards, Jamiat’s hold over the security sector started 
to erode, although it was never eradicated. The anti-Jamiat camp, 
however, was divided between technocrats with a penchant for institution 
building and Karzai’s own group, which gradually showed a greater and 
greater interest in building a patrimonial system around the president 
himself and his family. Personal interests played a role in these 
developments, but there was also a genuine debate on what system of 
government would be most effective in managing Afghanistan. Among 
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Westerners, there was by no means unanimity in favor of institution 
building, even if the principle was never openly challenged.84 
The political situation continued to deteriorate. From 2005 
onwards, President Karzai, by then elected by popular mandate and 
therefore on more solid ground in terms of international legitimacy, 
increasingly displayed irritation towards his Western patrons and advisers. 
He apparently resented them for putting pressure on him to take steps that 
he felt undermined his internal base of support and for providing what he 
believed was unsound and unrealistic advice. The rift deepened during the 
2008 U.S. presidential campaign when the Democrats started attacking 
President Karzai and his patrimonial system. Leaks of information and 
diplomatic incidents during 2009 consolidated Karzai’s lack of faith and 
trust in his American partners and strengthened his belief that they would 
eventually move to undermine or replace him. Karzai reacted to these 
developments by intensifying his efforts to build an autonomous power 
base, sometimes even trying to tap xenophobic and anti-Western feelings 
among the population. 85 
However, Karzai did not have everything his own way. It proved 
very difficult to reduce the influence that Jamiat-i Islami had established 
over the security apparatus (army, police, and intelligence) in 2001-02. 
Changing individuals at the top of the structure did not yield many results. 
Although by 2010 it could not be said that Jamiat enjoyed the same kind 
of near-monopoly over key positions it had in 2002, it was still strongly 
overrepresented. Its position in the Ministry of Interior was strengthened 
as a result of the appointment of Bismillah Mohammadi, one of its 
members, as minister in 2010, while President Karzai and his allies were 
trying to weaken it in the Ministry of Defense and in the National 
Directorate of Security. Political appointments and political purges did not 
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have positive repercussions on the security forces. Some turmoil was 
reported among Pashtun police officers, who accused Bismillah of 
bringing in Jamiatis and allies, as well as among Tajik and Hazara officers 
and troops in the army, who in turn resented the appointment of Pashtuns 
as their superiors by Karzai’s allies.86 
The viability of the security forces as effective organizations was 
also affected by political turmoil. In autumn 2009, the country seemed 
about to enter a phase of more direct confrontation between Jamiat and 
Karzai’s supporters due to a huge rift over the rigged presidential 
elections. Recruitment into the army and police collapsed as a result. 
Large pay raises and the resolution of the political crisis helped avert a 
full-blown crisis, but the episode highlighted the potential impact of 
political rivalry on the security forces. 
At the time of writing in summer 2011, many government officials 
are poorly motivated in their fight against the Taliban for a variety of 
reasons. In the large majority of cases, this is not due to any sympathy for 
the Taliban. Although collaboration with the insurgents exists within the 
police and the provincial administrations, the problem primarily lies with 
the lack of employment opportunities in Afghanistan. Many government 
officials entered government service out of practical financial 
considerations, which in turn means a modest inclination to take personal 
risks. The Taliban’s campaign of assassinations, every year taking the 
lives of hundreds of government officials and other pro-government 
individuals, has a significant impact in discouraging people from working 
for the government and encouraging those who do to keep a low profile. 
During the Marja phase of Operation Mushtarak in early 2010, it proved 
very difficult to convince government officials to volunteer for the job of 
manning the new district administration of Marja, despite the incentives 
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offered.87 Moreover, in a province like Kandahar, where the assassination 
campaign has been particularly intense, about two-thirds of the positions 
in the provincial administration are vacant.  
At the top levels of government, a laid-back attitude towards the 
conflict seems to be predominant; the government is mainly concerned 
about its political survival and has little interest in decisively ending a 
conflict that is bringing an unprecedented amount of external support to 
Afghanistan. It wasn’t until 2010 that the Afghan Ministry of Interior 
began to tackle the outflow of trained police officers towards private 
security companies, which has been a major problem in trying to increase 
the capacity of the police force. Many government officials own private 
security companies or are linked to them, which might be one reason for 
this slow response.88  
While there is a consensus that corruption and ineffective 
government agencies are a major source of support or at least tolerance for 
the insurgents, the Afghan government has not shown any willingness to 
fight corruption. Instead, they are trying to hamper any internationally led 
effort in that direction. Corruption has been used as a tool of co-optation, 
to buy political support, and it is now very difficult for the government to 
weed it out. 89At the same time, the government does not want the conflict 
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to escalate out of control and is worried about maintaining and expanding 
its external base of support in the event of a Western disengagement.  
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What effect did the Bonn agreement have on Afghanistan’s 
political system? How did a multinational NATO leadership environment 
influence those effects? 
2. How did the disintegration of Jamait-I Islami affect the 
security climate? 
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Annex F: Regional Powers and U.S./Allies 
 
A. Pakistan 
All the regional powers surrounding Afghanistan see developments 
as affecting their status and geopolitical interests. Pakistan is the most 
obvious case. Despite having long been an ally of the United States, the 
Pakistani military establishment felt bitter because of the deterioration in 
relations that followed the end of Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the 
U.S. reaction to its nuclear program. As a result, the Pakistanis stopped 
trusting the Americans. They believe that U.S. presence in Afghanistan 
destabilizes the whole region and that permanent U.S. military bases in 
Afghanistan could eventually be used against Pakistan, or at least against 
Pakistani interests.  
After the fall of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, the 
Pakistanis felt that Washington paid little attention to their interests in 
Afghanistan and did not help Islamabad place its clients within the Afghan 
ruling coalition; some low-profile efforts to launch a Taliban political 
party faltered in 2002 after attracting little support in Washington or 
Kabul. Washington believed that guarantees that Afghanistan would not 
develop a powerful army would reassure the Pakistani army, but the 
Pakistanis were irked by India’s rapidly growing influence in Afghanistan. 
The main anti-Taliban factions, brought to power by U.S. intervention in 
2001, were perceived by the Pakistanis as politically close to India. Some 
analysts suggest that the Indians might have tried to provoke the 
Pakistanis into a reaction that would spoil the Washington-Islamabad 
alliance: for example, India reopened consulates along the Afghan-
Pashtun belt, bid for road-building contracts near the Pakistani border, and 
deployed paramilitary forces to protect them.90  
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As a result, factions within the Pakistani army and its security 
service, the InterServices Intelligence, began to believe that in order to 
regain leverage for themselves and for their Taliban proteges, they had to 
demonstrate that Afghanistan could not be stabilized without involving 
Pakistan. Originally, the plan to reorganize the Taliban was probably 
modest, restricted to pressuring Kabul and Washington. The Taliban were 
initially so weak that the Pakistani army either had to mobilize on their 
behalf or allow Pakistani jihadist groups and networks of Taliban 
sympathizers in Afghanistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to carry out armed 
raids inside the country. Pakistani appetite seemed to have grown once the 
prospects for a full-scale insurgency appeared more promising, starting in 
2003. At that time, the Pakistani army became more involved in the 
conflict, increasing its level of direct financial support for the insurgents 
and even engaging ISAF and Afghan security forces along the border 
between the two countries.  
The Afghan Taliban leadership continues to reside in Pakistan, 
mostly unthreatened. Most Taliban leaders arrested by the Pakistanis were 
eventually released and none appears to have been killed. This is in direct 
contrast to the fate of Al Qaida leaders, many of whom were killed in 
Pakistani territory, even if some (notably Bin Laden himself) seems to 
have lived under some form of protection in Pakistan.91  
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B. India 
India may have the strongest interest of any other regional power 
in a stable and independent Afghanistan, which would likely be a natural 
enemy of Pakistan by virtue of the long-standing border dispute between 
those two countries. Since 1947, successive Afghan governments have 
taken up the issue of the border, and even President Karzai has flirted with 
the issue of claiming lost Afghan territories.92 Suggestions that 
Afghanistan renounce its demands for the return of the Pashtun territories 
lost at the end of the 19th century are not realistic, as whatever sense of 
national identity Afghanistan has is based on the idea of Pashtunistan—
belonging based on ethnicity. However, India does not share a border with 
Afghanistan and cannot afford massive levels of financial aid to offset 
Pakistan’s ability to interfere directly in much of Afghanistan.93 Its active 
intervention, therefore, has been limited. 
 
C. Iran 
The other regional power that has been very active in Afghanistan 
after 2001 is Iran. The Iranians welcomed the removal of the Taliban 
regime, which they viewed as too close to the Saudis.94 The Iranians first 
approached the Taliban in 2005, initially with low-profile help, mainly 
aimed at establishing contact. Since then, relations between the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards and selected Taliban commanders have warmed, 
and the level of support appears to have increased relentlessly in 2008-09. 
Reports emerged in 2010 that Taliban leadership had approached the 
Revolutionary Guards for Iranian support to the Taliban as a whole, as 
                                                          
92 Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables from Kabul (London : Harper, 2011). 
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opposed to selected commanders in the field. Reports also suggest that the 
Revolutionary Guards have been training Taliban fighters since 2009.95  
 
D. Russia 
In comparison, Russia has generally maintained a low profile in 
the post-2001 conflict. Moscow seems to view Afghanistan as an 
opportunity for extracting some concessions from Washington on other 
fronts, rather than as an area of direct interest. In 2009-10, with Central 
Asian Islamists turning up in northern Afghanistan and starting to infiltrate 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan acquired a new importance to Moscow and some 
greater cooperation with the Afghan security forces started. 
 
E. American and Allied Interests 
The United States entered Afghanistan in 2001 for obvious 
reasons; no government could have avoided retaliating for attacks on the 
motherland. With the rapid demise of the Taliban in early 2002, however, 
U.S. aims in Afghanistan became more blurred. Washington appears not 
have had a well-defined plan for Afghanistan beyond establishing a 
friendly government. This helps explain why the growing Taliban 
insurgency that started in 2003 initially received scant attention in 
Washington. Even after the insurgency appeared to be a serious threat in 
2006, the United States did not mobilize considerable resources for 
Afghanistan for another two years. Moreover, even then there was no 
coherent, holistic plan on how the newly available resources should be 
spent, which meant that little was achieved in terms of stemming the rise 
of the insurgency. Finally, Washington paid little attention to institution 
                                                          
95 Diplomatic sources in Kabul, October 2009 and April 2010; Maseh Zarif and Ahmad 
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building in Afghanistan, relying instead on personal connections with 
President Karzai and other key players to maintain a rapport; in turn, 
Karzai’s own patrimonial inclinations aroused few objections in 
Washington.96 
The attitude in Western Europe was very different from the 
American approach on most counts. The Europeans had no reason for 
being in Afghanistan other than the desire to maintain a constructive 
relationship with the U.S. within NATO; as a result, they were only 
prepared to commit a limited number of resources and energy to the war.97 
As the conflict escalated, the Europeans started regretting their sometimes 
high-profile involvement and downsized their role. By 2010, most 
European players in Afghanistan wanted to find a way out of the UN-
endorsed peacekeeping operation that had unexpectedly turned into a war. 
Apart from the British and the Danes, the Europeans had never fully 
committed to combat in Afghanistan. In private and increasingly in public, 
this was played out as a shift in strategies; the dominant thinking in 2010 
was to move the effort toward training Afghan policemen and soldiers and 
to gradually withdraw the European combat units.98  
To the extent that they were committed to the counterinsurgency 
effort, each European army had its own doctrine. The British and the 
French particularly guarded their COIN traditions. Even then, each new 
commander, particularly in the less centralized British system, introduced 
his own version of how to fight the war. This was also true of the 
Americans: in the absence of clear political directives coming from 
Washington, each U.S. commander stressed different aspects of the 
counterinsurgency effort. 99 
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98 Personal communications with Western diplomats, 2009-11. 
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With OEF playing a marginal role in Afghanistan after 2008, ISAF 
became by far the dominant foreign player. ISAF had a bureaucratically 
driven mission without its own aims until 2009, when it became more goal 
oriented after acquiring stronger leadership under first Gen. McChrystal 
and then Gen. Petraeus. Moreover, ISAF has transitioned from being 
largely reactive with long delays to being increasingly proactive and has 
made efforts to seize the initiative from the Taliban and break the 
momentum of the insurgency.  
There is some inherent tension between the goals of the military 
and those of the politicians, which at times has surfaced dramatically, in 
particular with the dismissal of Gen. McChrystal from his job in 2010. 
Short of any external constraints, the military seemed to be inclined to 
fight until they are confident that they can claim victory; the politicians are 
more in a hurry and want the war wrapped up relatively quickly. 
Budgetary worries, including the estimated war cost for the United States 
of US$120 billion in 2010, add to the politicans’ sense of urgency, but 
there are also strategic reasons for disengaging: with almost the whole US 
armed force tied up in Afghanistan, a serious crisis occurring anywhere 
else in the world would be hard to respond to. Indeed, early 2011 
developments within the Arab world highlighted how Washington’s 
strategic concerns do not end in Afghanistan.100 
The Taliban, probably advised by allies inside Pakistan, are aware 
of this gap and feel encouraged to stay the course. They seem to expect 
that the military pressure coming from ISAF simply will not be 
sustainable in the medium and long term. They also try to maintain a high 
level of violence in order to demonstrate that the increased military 
pressure is not achieving its aims. They are ready to pay a political cost for 
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it, for example by appointing radical commanders who will be difficult to 
control later but are keen to fight and ready to risk their lives.101 
 
Discussion Questions 
1. What is Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan in regards to 
India? 
2. Between Pakistani, Indian, Iranian, and Russian national 
interests in Afghanistan, who has the most to lose and gain from the 
current conflict?  
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